10th Schedule of the Constitution of India (Anti-Defection Law)

The 10th Schedule was added to the Constitution by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985. Its primary objective is to curb political defections and ensure stability and discipline in India’s parliamentary democracy.

Purpose and Rationale

• To prevent unprincipled political defections driven by office, power, or personal gain.
• To protect the electoral mandate and strengthen the party system.
• To reduce political instability caused by frequent changes in government.

Scope and Applicability

• Applies to members of:
  • Lok Sabha
  • Rajya Sabha
  • State Legislative Assemblies
  • State Legislative Councils

Grounds for Disqualification

A legislator can be disqualified if:

1. Voluntarily Giving Up Party Membership

• Formal resignation is not necessary.
• Conduct indicating disloyalty or abandonment of party ideology can attract disqualification.

2. Defiance of Party Whip

• Voting or abstaining contrary to party directions without prior permission.
• Disqualification can be avoided if the party condones the act within 15 days.

3. Independent Members

• If an independently elected member joins a political party after election.

4. Nominated Members

• If a nominated member joins a political party after six months of taking office.

Exception: Merger Provision

• Disqualification does not apply if:
  • At least two-thirds of the legislators of a party agree to merge with another party.
• The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003 removed the earlier provision allowing splits by one-third members.

Authority for Decision

• Speaker of Lok Sabha or State Legislative Assembly
• Chairman of Rajya Sabha or State Legislative Council

Judicial Review

• Speaker’s decision is subject to judicial review on grounds of:
  • Mala fide intention
  • Constitutional violation
  • Procedural impropriety

Important Supreme Court Judgments

• Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992)
  
  • Upheld the constitutional validity of the 10th Schedule.
  • Allowed judicial review of Speaker’s decisions.
• Nabam Rebia Case (2016)
  
  • Speaker cannot adjudicate defection cases while a motion for their removal is pending.
• Keisham Meghachandra Singh Case (2020)
  
  • Directed Speakers to decide disqualification cases within a reasonable time, preferably three months.

Criticism

• Curtails freedom of speech and conscience of legislators.
• Concentrates excessive power in party leadership.
• Speaker’s role often perceived as politically biased.
• Encourages bulk defections under the merger provision.

Key Facts for Revision

• Inserted by: 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985
• Strengthened by: 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003
• Objective: Prevent political defections
• Decision Authority: Speaker / Chairman
• Judicial Review: Permitted

52nd Constitutional Amendment Act 1985

The 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985 was enacted to address the growing problem of political defections in India, which had led to frequent government instability and erosion of public trust in the democratic process. This amendment introduced the Anti-Defection Law into the Constitution.

Background

• During the 1960s–1980s, India witnessed rampant party-switching by legislators, often motivated by personal gain or office.
• The phenomenon popularly came to be known as “Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram” politics.
• These defections weakened elected governments and undermined the electoral mandate.

Key Provision

• The Act inserted the Tenth Schedule into the Constitution.
• The Schedule lays down the grounds for disqualification of Members of Parliament and State Legislatures on the basis of defection.

Main Features

• A legislator can be disqualified if they:
  • Voluntarily give up the membership of their political party.
  • Vote or abstain from voting contrary to the party whip without permission.
• Independent members are disqualified if they join any political party after election.
• Nominated members are disqualified if they join a political party after six months.
• The Speaker/Chairman of the House is the authority to decide defection cases.

Original Exceptions

• The Act initially allowed:
  • Split in a party if at least one-third members broke away.
  • Merger of parties if two-thirds members agreed.
• The split provision was later removed by the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003 due to misuse.

Significance

• Promoted party discipline and stability in governments.
• Strengthened the parliamentary system by discouraging opportunistic defections.
• Sought to protect the will of voters expressed through elections.

Criticism

• Limits the freedom of speech and conscience of legislators.
• Concentrates excessive power in party leadership.
• Speaker’s role has often been criticised for political bias.
• Has not fully eliminated defections, only changed their form.

Conclusion

The 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985 was a landmark reform aimed at stabilising Indian democracy. While it curbed individual defections, evolving political practices have highlighted the need for further reforms to balance legislative independence with political stability.

 91st Constitutional Amendment Act 2003

The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003 was enacted to strengthen the Anti-Defection framework and curb the misuse of constitutional offices for political inducements. It aimed to promote clean politics, stability of governments, and accountability in the parliamentary system.

Background

• After the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, the Anti-Defection Law was frequently misused through engineered splits in political parties.
• Defections continued, often rewarded with ministerial positions, leading to oversized cabinets and political instability.
• The need arose to close loopholes and reduce incentives for defections.

Key Provisions

• Amended Articles 75 and 164 of the Constitution.
• Inserted Article 75(1A) and Article 164(1A) limiting the size of the Council of Ministers.
• Inserted Article 361B disqualifying defectors from ministerial offices.
• Made consequential changes to the Tenth Schedule.

Major Features

• Cap on Council of Ministers:
  • Total number of ministers, including the Prime Minister/Chief Minister, shall not exceed 15% of the total strength of the Lok Sabha or State Legislative Assembly.
  • Minimum strength fixed at 12 ministers.
• Disqualification from Office:
  • A legislator disqualified under the Tenth Schedule cannot be appointed as a minister until re-elected.
• Removal of Split Provision:
  • The earlier provision allowing defection by one-third members (split) was deleted.
  • Only mergers supported by at least two-thirds members are now permitted.
• Bar on Remunerative Political Posts:
  • Defectors are barred from holding offices such as chairpersonships of government bodies until re-election.

Significance

• Reduced the incentive of office-of-profit-driven defections.
• Prevented jumbo cabinets, improving administrative efficiency.
• Strengthened the Anti-Defection Law by plugging major loopholes.
• Promoted political stability and ethical governance.

Limitations

• Does not address mass defections supported by two-thirds of legislators.
• Speaker’s discretionary power in defection cases remains unchanged.
• Political manoeuvring continues through resignations and re-elections.

Conclusion

The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003 marked a critical reform in India’s constitutional journey by reinforcing party discipline and reducing opportunistic politics. However, persistent challenges indicate the need for further reforms to ensure neutrality, transparency, and timely adjudication in defection matters.