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UnderStand UPSC Daily Current Affairs Practice
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25 September 2026 • UPSC CSE

Read the news. Test the concept. Write the Mains answer.

This interactive edition converts each current-affairs item into one Prelims-level MCQ, one Mains-level question, and a compact value-addition section for revision.

+2 correct −0.66 incorrect Explanation after attempt Image/PDF answer upload
NEWS 1 GS2 • Election Commission, Constitutional Bodies, Electoral Reforms Source: The Indian Express

Motion in Both Houses, 2/3rd Majority: Process to Remove the CEC

Context: Reports of differences within the three-member Election Commission of India have brought its functioning and independence into focus, and a proposed motion seeking removal of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar has brought the constitutional procedure for removal into discussion.

Constitutional Framework of the ECI

Article 324
Establishes the ECI and gives it superintendence, direction and control over elections to Parliament, State Legislatures, President and Vice-President; the CEC functions as Chairman when other Commissioners are appointed.

Removal of the CEC

Special protection
Under Article 324(5), the CEC can be removed only in the same manner and on the same grounds as a Supreme Court Judge — i.e., for proved misbehaviour or incapacity.
Process
Initiation needs signatures of at least 100 Lok Sabha or 50 Rajya Sabha members under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968; a three-member inquiry committee examines allegations; both Houses must pass the motion by a majority of total membership and at least two-thirds present and voting; the President then issues the removal order.

Removal of Other Election Commissioners & Why Such Protection

Different protection
Under Section 11(3) of the CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023, an EC other than the CEC cannot be removed except on the CEC's recommendation — no Supreme Court Judge-like parliamentary process applies to them.
Rationale
Strong removal safeguards ensure electoral independence, security of tenure and constitutional neutrality, preventing the executive from controlling the institution through the threat of removal.
Key Takeaway: The CEC and the other two Election Commissioners aren't equally protected — the CEC needs a Supreme-Court-Judge-style parliamentary process to be removed, while an EC can be removed on the CEC's own recommendation, a structural asymmetry that's easy to overlook until a removal motion actually surfaces it.

Prelims Practice MCQ

+2 correct • −0.66 wrong

Consider the following statements:
1. Under Article 324(5), the Chief Election Commissioner can be removed in the same manner as a Supreme Court Judge.
2. An Election Commissioner other than the CEC can be removed only on the recommendation of the CEC.
3. A motion for removal of the CEC requires a simple majority of members present and voting in each House.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

Explanation: Statements 1 and 2 are correct. Statement 3 is incorrect — the motion requires a majority of total membership and at least two-thirds of members present and voting, not a simple majority.

UPSC Mains Question

10 Marks • 150 Words

Discuss the constitutional procedure for the removal of the Chief Election Commissioner and examine why such strong protection is provided to this office.

Attempt before opening the value-addition tab.
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Use after attempting the Mains answer
  • State Article 324(5)'s precise standard — 'same manner and grounds as a Supreme Court Judge' — as the core legal safeguard.
  • Cite the exact procedural numbers — 100 LS/50 RS signatures, three-member inquiry, two-thirds present-and-voting threshold.
  • Distinguish the CEC's removal process from other ECs' (CEC recommendation only, no parliamentary process) — a frequently tested asymmetry.
  • Name Section 11(3) of the CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023 precisely for the other-Commissioners' removal basis.
  • Frame the rationale explicitly around electoral independence and checks on executive power, not just 'strong protection'.
NEWS 2 GS3 • Indian Economy, Growth, Employment & Investment Source: The Indian Express

What Would It Take to Triple the Size of India's Economy?

Context: JPMorgan Chase Chairman and CEO Jamie Dimon has suggested India's economy could become nearly three times its present size over the next decade; feasibility depends heavily on whether GDP is measured in rupee or dollar terms, given exchange-rate effects.

What Tripling the Economy Means

The target
India's nominal GDP is around $4.2 trillion; tripling it means reaching roughly $12.5 trillion.
Currency effect
Domestic GDP is measured in rupees while international comparisons use dollars; rupee depreciation means strong domestic growth can still translate into a smaller dollar-GDP increase.

How Much Growth Is Required

Required growth rates
Reaching $12.5 trillion by 2036 needs about 11.6% annual dollar-GDP growth, which — accounting for expected currency depreciation — translates to roughly 14.7% annual nominal rupee-GDP growth.
Current trajectory
India's dollar-GDP grew at about 6.2% CAGR during 2014-2026; continuing at this rate would yield only around $7.6 trillion by 2036 — well short of the target.

Challenges & What Needs to Be Done

Key challenges
Currency depreciation, sustaining productivity gains, generating enough productive non-farm employment, sustained investment needs, global protectionism/volatility, and macroeconomic stability.
Way forward
Raise productivity; boost public/private investment; expand manufacturing and global value chain integration; shift workers to manufacturing/modern services; develop human capital; strengthen exports; maintain macro stability.
Key Takeaway: The gap between 6.2% and 14.7% annual growth is the whole story here — Jamie Dimon's tripling target isn't just ambitious, it requires more than doubling India's actual growth trajectory of the past decade, which is why currency effects alone can make or break whether it's even reachable.

Prelims Practice MCQ

+2 correct • −0.66 wrong

Consider the following statements:
1. Reaching a $12.5 trillion economy by 2036 is estimated to require about 11.6% annual growth in dollar-denominated GDP.
2. Rupee depreciation would make it easier to reach a given dollar-GDP target using a lower rupee growth rate.
3. India's dollar-GDP grew at approximately 6.2% CAGR during 2014-2026.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

Explanation: Statements 1 and 3 are correct. Statement 2 is incorrect — rupee depreciation makes it harder, not easier, requiring a higher rupee-GDP growth rate (about 14.7%) to reach the same dollar target.

UPSC Mains Question

10 Marks • 150 Words

Discuss the growth requirements and key challenges in tripling the size of India's economy over the next decade.

Attempt before opening the value-addition tab.
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Use after attempting the Mains answer
  • Use the precise figures — $4.2tn current, $12.5tn target, 11.6% dollar-growth requirement, 14.7% rupee-growth requirement, 6.2% actual CAGR (2014-26).
  • Explain the rupee-vs-dollar GDP distinction explicitly — the article's central conceptual point often missed in growth-target discussions.
  • List challenges precisely — currency depreciation, productivity, employment absorption, investment, global environment, macro stability — individually.
  • Name specific Way Forward measures — productivity, investment, manufacturing/GVC integration, human capital, exports — rather than 'grow faster'.
  • Contrast the required 14.7% rate against the achieved 6.2% CAGR to show the scale of the gap quantitatively.
NEWS 3 GS2 • International Relations, United Nations & UN Reform Source: The Indian Express

'Enemy State' in UN Charter: Why Japan Wants It Removed

Context: Japan has renewed its demand for deletion of the 'enemy State' clauses from the UN Charter, which originated in the post-World War II security arrangement, gaining fresh relevance amid Japan's present security tensions with China and Russia and wider UN reform debates.

Origin & the Clauses

Why Japan was an 'enemy State'
Japan fought the Allied powers as part of the Axis powers; Article 53(2) defines an enemy State as any state that was an enemy of a signatory during WWII, principally targeting Germany, Italy and Japan.
The clauses
Article 53 creates an exception on enforcement measures against an enemy State without normal Security Council authorisation; Article 107 preserves the validity of post-WWII actions against former enemy States; Article 77 references enemy States in the trusteeship system.

Why Japan Wants Removal & Why They Persist

Japan's case
Japan became a UN Member State in 1956; retaining wartime-status provisions is seen as inconsistent with sovereign equality, and China/Russia's references to the clauses have acquired present-day security significance.
Why not yet deleted
An ordinary General Assembly resolution cannot delete Charter provisions; Resolution 50/52 (1995) recognised them as obsolete (adopted 155-0-3) but did not itself delete them — political differences among major powers stalled formal amendment.

How They Can Be Removed

Amendment process
Requires the Article 108 procedure: adoption by two-thirds of the General Assembly, then ratification via national constitutional procedures by two-thirds of Member States, which must include all five permanent members (US, UK, France, Russia, China) individually — no separate Security Council vote is needed.
Key Takeaway: A 155-0-3 vote calling the clauses obsolete back in 1995 still hasn't deleted them — showing that recognising a problem and fixing it are very different thresholds under the UN Charter, since actual deletion needs all five permanent members to individually ratify the change.

Prelims Practice MCQ

+2 correct • −0.66 wrong

Consider the following statements:
1. Japan became a UN Member State in 1956.
2. General Assembly Resolution 50/52 (1995) formally deleted the 'enemy State' clauses from the UN Charter.
3. Amendment of the UN Charter under Article 108 requires ratification by all five permanent members of the Security Council.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

Explanation: Statements 1 and 3 are correct. Statement 2 is incorrect — the resolution recognised the clauses as obsolete but did not itself delete them; formal amendment was never completed.

UPSC Mains Question

10 Marks • 150 Words

Discuss the origin of the 'enemy State' clauses in the UN Charter and examine the process and challenges involved in their formal deletion.

Attempt before opening the value-addition tab.
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Use after attempting the Mains answer
  • Cite Articles 53, 107 and 77 precisely as the three Charter provisions containing 'enemy State' references.
  • Name Resolution 50/52 (1995) and its exact vote (155-0-3) as the key but incomplete reform milestone.
  • State the full Article 108 amendment chain — two-thirds GA adoption, two-thirds Member State ratification, all-P5 ratification — precisely.
  • Note Japan's 1956 UN membership date to show the provisions' anachronism concretely.
  • Frame the core lesson: recognising obsolescence (by resolution) is not the same as formal deletion (by Charter amendment).
NEWS 4 GS2 • Parliament & State Legislatures / Anti-Defection Law / Electoral Reforms Source: The Hindu

111 MPs and MLAs Switched Sides After Being Elected: Data

Context: An Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) analysis found 111 sitting MPs and MLAs who changed political parties after being elected during 2022-2026, renewing attention on whether the Tenth Schedule adequately addresses post-election party switching.

What the Data Shows

Break-up
26 Lok Sabha MPs, 7 Rajya Sabha MPs and 78 MLAs switched parties; State legislatures dominate, with 78 of 111 cases involving MLAs.
Concentration
Nagaland recorded the highest at 32 cases (29%), followed by West Bengal (20, 18%); NDPP (25), Trinamool Congress (20) and Congress (19) together accounted for 64 cases (58%) of all switches, contributing to changes in legislative majorities and fall of some State governments.

Why This Doesn't Automatically Mean Disqualification

The legal gap
The anti-defection law doesn't ban every party switch; disqualification under the Tenth Schedule arises mainly when a legislator voluntarily gives up party membership or votes/abstains against party direction — a legislator can change allegiance without triggering these specific conditions.

The Tenth Schedule & Needed Reforms

Current framework
Inserted by the 52nd Amendment Act, 1985; the two-thirds merger exception exempts disqualification when a party merges and at least two-thirds of its legislature party agrees; the Speaker/Chairman decides, subject to judicial review — upheld in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992).
Reforms needed
Independent adjudication (with ECI involvement, as recommended by the Dinesh Goswami Committee) instead of leaving decisions solely to the Speaker/Chairman; time-bound decisions; preventing misuse of the merger provision; balancing discipline with legitimate dissent.
Key Takeaway: 111 switches sound like a widespread breakdown of the anti-defection law, but the real story is narrower — most of these switches simply didn't trigger the Tenth Schedule's specific disqualification conditions, showing the gap is in what the law covers, not enforcement of what it already covers.

Prelims Practice MCQ

+2 correct • −0.66 wrong

Consider the following statements:
1. The Tenth Schedule was inserted into the Constitution by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985.
2. Every instance of a legislator changing political parties after election results in automatic disqualification under the Tenth Schedule.
3. Disqualification does not apply when a party merges with another and at least two-thirds of its legislature party agrees to the merger.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

Explanation: Statements 1 and 3 are correct. Statement 2 is incorrect — disqualification is not automatic for every party switch; it applies only under specific conditions such as voluntarily giving up party membership or voting against party direction.

UPSC Mains Question

10 Marks • 150 Words

Discuss the findings of the ADR report on legislators switching political parties and examine the adequacy of the Tenth Schedule in addressing post-election defections.

Attempt before opening the value-addition tab.
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Use after attempting the Mains answer
  • Use the precise break-up — 26 LS MPs, 7 RS MPs, 78 MLAs (111 total) — and the Nagaland/West Bengal concentration figures.
  • State the Tenth Schedule's two specific disqualification grounds — voluntary resignation, voting/abstaining against party direction — precisely, not 'switching parties' generically.
  • Cite Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) as the case upholding the Tenth Schedule's constitutional validity.
  • Name the Dinesh Goswami Committee's recommendation for ECI-linked independent adjudication as a specific reform proposal.
  • Frame the core analytical point: the gap is in what triggers disqualification, not lax enforcement of existing triggers.
NEWS 5 GS2 • International Relations; GS3 • Indian Economy, Financial Infrastructure Source: The Hindu

What Are the Alternatives to the SWIFT Payment System?

Context: SWIFT is the dominant global financial messaging network for cross-border payment instructions; sanctions, geopolitical conflicts and concerns over dependence on Western-centric financial infrastructure have encouraged countries to develop alternative payment and messaging arrangements.

Main Alternatives

CIPS (China) & SPFS (Russia)
CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System) facilitates RMB payments and supports currency internationalisation; SPFS (System for Transfer of Financial Messages) was developed by Russia in 2014, gaining reliance after Russian banks were disconnected from SWIFT in 2022.
mBridge & India's SFMS
mBridge — a BIS Innovation Hub project with China, Hong Kong, Thailand and the UAE — explored multi-CBDC cross-border settlement, reaching MVP stage in 2024 before concluding; India has its own Structured Financial Messaging System (SFMS) and is exploring CBDC-linked cross-border payments.

How These Differ from SWIFT

Key distinction
SWIFT is mainly a messaging system — it doesn't itself settle money; CIPS integrates messaging with RMB clearing/settlement; SPFS is primarily a messaging alternative; mBridge explores direct multi-CBDC settlement.

Success & Why Countries Look Beyond SWIFT

Scale so far
By June 2026, CIPS had 210 direct and 1,619 indirect participants across 191 countries/regions — the most expanded alternative; SPFS remains largely Russia-centred; none currently matches SWIFT's global scale and network effects.
Motivations
Sanctions vulnerability, financial sovereignty, currency internationalisation, technological efficiency (lower cost/time via CBDCs), and building a more multipolar financial system.
Key Takeaway: CIPS's 210 direct and 1,619 indirect participants across 191 countries shows a genuine alternative gaining real scale — but the fact that none of these systems yet matches SWIFT's network effects is exactly why countries build these systems for resilience, not as a replacement.

Prelims Practice MCQ

+2 correct • −0.66 wrong

Consider the following statements:
1. SWIFT itself settles cross-border payments between financial institutions.
2. CIPS integrates payment messaging with renminbi clearing and settlement infrastructure.
3. The mBridge project explored direct cross-border settlement using multiple Central Bank Digital Currencies.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

Explanation: Statements 2 and 3 are correct. Statement 1 is incorrect — SWIFT is mainly a messaging system; it does not itself settle the money.

UPSC Mains Question

10 Marks • 150 Words

Discuss the major alternatives to the SWIFT payment system and examine why countries are increasingly looking beyond SWIFT for cross-border financial messaging and settlement.

Attempt before opening the value-addition tab.
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Use after attempting the Mains answer
  • Name all four systems precisely — CIPS (China), SPFS (Russia), mBridge (multi-country CBDC), SFMS (India) — with their distinct mechanisms.
  • State the key SWIFT distinction — messaging only, not settlement — as the conceptual anchor for comparing alternatives.
  • Use CIPS's exact scale figures — 210 direct/1,619 indirect participants, 191 countries (June 2026) — for quantitative precision.
  • Note mBridge's conclusion as a BIS project despite reaching MVP stage — showing technological success doesn't guarantee continuation.
  • List the five motivations (sanctions vulnerability, financial sovereignty, currency internationalisation, efficiency, multipolarity) for building alternatives.
NEWS 6 GS3 • Science & Technology, Digital Infrastructure; GS2 • Governance Source: The Hindu

Digi Yatra to Be Available to Passengers Flying Overseas

Context: Digi Yatra, currently used mainly for domestic air travel, is being extended to international departures on a pilot basis, running from October to December at Bengaluru, Delhi, Hyderabad, Kochi and Mumbai airports.

What Is Digi Yatra & What's Changing

How it works
A facial-recognition-based airport access system linking a passenger's verified identity to their boarding pass, reducing the need to repeatedly show physical documents at checkpoints.
International pilot
Passengers flying abroad will scan their e-passport and verify identity via a selfie; both Indian and foreign passengers can participate; immigration remains outside the system initially — coverage is limited to airport entry and security checkpoints in the first phase.

Towards a Digital Travel Identity

Cross-border ambition
The goal is a unique digital travel identity securely recognised at multiple stages of international travel; through the APTITUDE consortium, India is exploring cross-border sharing of verified travel credentials.
EU interoperability
Digi Yatra is working towards interoperability with the European Union Digital Identity framework, reflecting a broader move towards self-sovereign digital identity for paperless, contactless and seamless travel.
Key Takeaway: The pilot's real significance isn't facial recognition at five more airports — it's the ambition behind APTITUDE and EU interoperability: a single verified digital identity usable at both departure and destination airports, which is a much bigger shift than extending an existing domestic system abroad.

Prelims Practice MCQ

+2 correct • −0.66 wrong

Consider the following statements:
1. The international Digi Yatra pilot will run from October to December at five airports.
2. Immigration checks are fully integrated into Digi Yatra from the very first phase of the international pilot.
3. Digi Yatra is working towards interoperability with the European Union Digital Identity framework.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

Explanation: Statements 1 and 3 are correct. Statement 2 is incorrect — immigration remains outside Digi Yatra during the first phase; coverage is initially limited to airport entry and security checkpoints.

UPSC Mains Question

10 Marks • 150 Words

Discuss the extension of Digi Yatra to international departures and examine its significance for building a unified digital travel identity.

Attempt before opening the value-addition tab.
Accepted: JPG, JPEG, PNG, WEBP or PDF. The standalone file previews your answer locally; connect the API hook for real server submission.
Use after attempting the Mains answer
  • Name the five pilot airports (Bengaluru, Delhi, Hyderabad, Kochi, Mumbai) and the October-December pilot window precisely.
  • State the e-passport-plus-selfie verification mechanism explicitly as what's new for international departures.
  • Note the immigration-exclusion caveat in phase one — a frequently tested 'what's NOT yet covered' distinction.
  • Name the APTITUDE consortium and EU Digital Identity framework explicitly as the cross-border interoperability initiatives.
  • Frame the broader concept as 'self-sovereign digital identity' — the precise term for the underlying policy direction.

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