Historical Evolution
India’s relations with Central Asia are rooted in long-standing civilisational, commercial and cultural exchanges. The Silk Route linked the Indian subcontinent with major Central Asian centres such as Samarkand and Bukhara, facilitating movement of traders, scholars, religious ideas and artistic traditions. The Mughal connection through the Ferghana Valley further deepened this historical interface.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, India established diplomatic relations with the five Central Asian Republics:
- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Tajikistan
- Turkmenistan
- Uzbekistan
For much of the 1990s and early 2000s, engagement remained politically cordial but economically limited because of geography, weak transport links and India’s greater diplomatic focus on South Asia and major global powers.
A more structured phase began with the Connect Central Asia Policy, 2012, which sought deeper cooperation in:
- politics and diplomacy;
- energy;
- security;
- trade and investment;
- education and capacity building;
- people-to-people relations.
Political outreach intensified in 2015 when India undertook high-level engagement with all five Central Asian states.
The relationship became increasingly institutionalised through:
- India–Central Asia Dialogue, 2019
- India–Central Asia Business Council
- NSA-level security dialogue
- Joint Working Group on Afghanistan
- First India–Central Asia Summit, 2022
This marked a transition from episodic bilateral engagement towards a region-wide strategic framework.
Why Central Asia Matters to India
Central Asia occupies a strategically important position at the intersection of Russia, China, Afghanistan, Iran and the wider Eurasian space.
Its importance for India is multidimensional.
Geopolitical Access to Eurasia
Central Asia provides India with strategic depth beyond South Asia and a platform for engagement with wider Eurasian geopolitics.
It is particularly relevant as India seeks a more visible role in a region where:
- Russia remains a major security actor;
- China has expanded rapidly through trade and infrastructure;
- Turkey, the EU and Gulf countries are also increasing their presence.
Energy and Critical Resources
The region is rich in:
- oil;
- natural gas;
- uranium;
- hydropower;
- critical minerals.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are important for uranium cooperation, while Turkmenistan remains significant for natural gas.
The proposed TAPI pipeline reflects the long-standing objective of accessing Central Asian gas, although security and political instability have delayed implementation.
Security and Afghanistan
Central Asia is directly exposed to instability emanating from Afghanistan.
India and Central Asian states share concerns relating to:
- terrorism;
- radicalisation;
- narcotics trafficking;
- organised crime;
- cross-border extremist networks.
This creates scope for intelligence sharing, defence training, counterterrorism cooperation and engagement through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
Connectivity
India’s biggest structural constraint is the absence of direct land access through Pakistan.
This makes alternative corridors particularly important:
- Chabahar Port
- International North-South Transport Corridor
- Iran–Caspian routes
- multimodal connectivity through the wider Eurasian region.
Connectivity is therefore not merely an economic issue. It determines the practical depth of India’s entire Central Asia strategy.
Markets and Economic Opportunities
Central Asia offers growing opportunities in:
- pharmaceuticals;
- healthcare;
- information technology;
- agriculture;
- textiles;
- engineering goods;
- digital services;
- renewable energy;
- infrastructure.
However, economic engagement remains below potential because of high transport costs, limited private investment and weak financial connectivity.
Key Drivers of the Relationship
The relationship is sustained by several overlapping strategic drivers.
Political Driver
India increasingly treats Central Asia as part of its extended neighbourhood rather than as a distant external region.
Regular summits and ministerial dialogues have strengthened political visibility, although implementation of agreed initiatives remains uneven.
Economic Driver
Trade remains modest compared with India’s overall external trade, reflecting the cost imposed by geography.
India generally exports:
- pharmaceuticals;
- machinery;
- textiles;
- engineering goods.
It imports:
- hydrocarbons;
- uranium;
- minerals;
- other raw materials.
The relationship therefore has room to diversify towards higher-value sectors.
Energy Driver
India seeks to reduce excessive concentration of energy dependence on West Asia.
Central Asia offers opportunities in:
- uranium supply;
- natural gas;
- oil;
- renewable-energy cooperation.
Security Driver
Afghanistan remains a central concern. Central Asian states are important partners in counterterrorism, narcotics control and regional stability.
Soft-Power Driver
India possesses significant goodwill through:
- Bollywood;
- yoga;
- education;
- medical services;
- ICCR scholarships;
- ITEC capacity-building programmes.
This gives India a relatively benign image compared with external powers seen as more economically or strategically dominant.
China and the Regional Balance
China has emerged as the most economically influential external actor in Central Asia.
Its influence rests on:
- Belt and Road infrastructure;
- energy pipelines;
- mining investment;
- trade;
- transport corridors;
- development financing.
China has also expanded political and security engagement through:
- SCO;
- C5+1 mechanisms;
- bilateral security cooperation;
- military exercises;
- counterterrorism coordination.
Its wider initiatives, including the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilisation Initiative, are also being used to deepen regional influence.
For India, the objective is not necessarily to compete project-for-project with China.
A more realistic strategy is to differentiate through:
- pharmaceuticals;
- digital public infrastructure;
- education;
- capacity building;
- healthcare;
- democratic institutional cooperation;
- non-dominating development partnerships.
Central Asian countries themselves often prefer multi-vector diplomacy, which creates space for India as an additional strategic partner.
Major Constraints
Despite strong political intent, India–Central Asia relations continue to face several structural limitations.
Geographical Disconnect
India lacks direct overland access to the region. Pakistan’s refusal to allow transit remains the single biggest connectivity constraint.
Afghanistan Instability
Political uncertainty and security risks limit the viability of transit routes passing through Afghanistan.
Weak Trade and Investment
Commercial ties remain small because of:
- high logistics costs;
- limited direct shipping and rail integration;
- weak banking channels;
- low private-sector familiarity with Central Asian markets.
China’s Economic Dominance
China’s scale of investment, trade and infrastructure financing is significantly larger than India’s, limiting India’s ability to compete through capital-intensive projects.
Russia’s Continued Influence
Russia remains deeply embedded in the region through:
- security institutions;
- energy linkages;
- labour migration;
- historical networks.
This shapes the strategic choices available to Central Asian states.
Slow Implementation
India has created multiple dialogues and institutional mechanisms, but the gap between diplomatic announcements and actual economic projects remains substantial.
Emerging Areas of Cooperation
The relationship is gradually moving beyond conventional security and energy cooperation.
Promising sectors include:
- Digital Public Infrastructure
- fintech and digital payments;
- artificial intelligence;
- e-governance;
- pharmaceuticals and medical services;
- renewable energy;
- critical minerals;
- education and skill development;
- agricultural technology;
- connectivity infrastructure.
India’s experience in building low-cost digital public platforms can be particularly attractive to Central Asian states seeking modernisation without complete dependence on Western or Chinese technology ecosystems.
Way Forward
India needs a more coordinated Eurasian strategy in which Central Asia is treated as a long-term strategic region rather than an episodic diplomatic priority.
The main priorities should be:
- operationalising Chabahar and the INSTC more effectively;
- developing reliable financial and logistics links;
- increasing private-sector participation;
- expanding cooperation in uranium and critical minerals;
- strengthening digital and technology partnerships;
- regularising summit-level engagement;
- expanding ITEC and ICCR programmes;
- increasing joint counterterrorism and security cooperation;
- building stronger links through SCO and CICA.
The central challenge is to convert historical goodwill and political engagement into sustained economic and strategic presence.
